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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
POST-MODERN HALL OF MIRRORS*
International Legal Structures. By David Kennedy. Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987.
REVIEWED BY EDWARD M. MoRGAN**
Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins. My sin, my soul. Lo-lee-ta: the tip of the
tongue taking a trip of three steps down the palate to tap, at three, on the teeth.
Lo. Lee. -h!
International law devotes a great deal of attention to its sources. Scholars have
produced a large body of work about both the conditions under which treaties,
custom or general principles of law bind actors and the hierarchy among the various
doctrinal forms which might apply in a given instance.
2
I. INTRODUCT[ON
The opening lines of Vladimir Nabokov's most renowned
novel tend to take readers by surprise. Having heard of and
anticipated this famous story in which the term "nymphet" was
0 Copyright, 1988, Edward M. Morgan.
**Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
IV. Nabokov, Lolita in The Annotated Lolita, A. Appel, ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1970) at 11.
2D. Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
1987) at 11.
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coined, one might expect any number of approaches and themes: a
quasi-pornographic appeal to the senses, or perhaps a psycho-drama
of passion and guilt, or even a morality lesson in wrong and right.
Indeed, the first short sentences of the book are, although
sarcastically exaggerated in tone, seductive in just this way. The
remainder of the paragraph, however, reveals the author's hand,
exposing the novel as having little in common with what the reader
had been led to expect. Lolita is about neither sex, nor psychology,
nor morality. It is about the linguistic games we play in expressing
our feelings, thoughts and judgments in words 3 It is about modes
of expression rather than content; and in this it is the seminal post-
modem work of literary art.
David Kennedy's International Legal Structures needs no such
entrapment in its initial phrases. The very appearance of the book
- its expansive survey of subject matters contained in the table of
contents, its prolific and detailed footnote references, its rigorous
adherence to doctrinal terminology in chapter headings, et cetera -
accomplishes the task of a seductive first impression without the
need for any more direct opening moves. Indeed, the introduction
to the book goes so far as to warn the reader that although the
work may appear to be "structured somewhat like a treatise on
public international law," the narrative will "follow paths quite
unfamiliar to those ... who customarily follow doctrinal developments,
interactions and applications."
4
As the first sentence in the book reveals, Kennedy's interest
is in the modes of self-expression of international legal doctrine.
3From his jail cell early in the novel, the narrator Humbert is made, in mock sentiment,
to express the attitude of the entire work. "Oh, my Lolita, I have only words to play with!"
Nabokov, supra, note 1 at 34. See also Nabokov's characterization of himself as a writer, and
his perspective on his own efforts to express the view of the world that his life has given him:
My private tragedy, which cannot, and indeed should not, be anybody's concern, is
that I had to abandon my natural idiom, my untrammeled, rich, and infinitely docile
Russian tongue for a second-rate brand of English, devoid of any of those
apparatuses- the baffling mirror, the black velvet backdrop, the implied associations
and traditions - which the native illusionist, frac-tails flying, can magically use to
transcend the heritage in his own way.
V. Nabokov, "On a Book Entitled Lolita;' reprinted in The Annotated Lolita, supra, note 1,
313 at 318-319.
4Kennedy, supra, note 2 at 7.
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Modem international discourse typically casts states and statespersons
in the roles of heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators, et cetera.
For Kennedy, however, the only protagonist is doctrinal language
itself, which is presented as devoting "a great deal of attention to its
sources"5 where more traditional treatises would doubtless have one
nation devoting attention to the aggressive or offensive actions of
another. For Nabokov's Humbert, love-talk is love itself; and for
David Kennedy's lawyers and state-affiliated practitioners,
international norms take no form but that of their rhetorical
structures.
It is thus a moment of admirable understatement when
Kennedy asserts in his introduction that, "[t]he approach which I
take to these familiar materials is somewhat unorthodox."6 Indeed,
the book's opening ploy does not stop at the initial distancing of the
doctrinal rhetoric from its content. As the second sentence reveals,
a conscious attempt is made to distance the author himself, along
with his work, from the scholars and writing with which international
law has traditionally been populated and by which it is generally
characterized.
International law as contemporary scholars know and study
it, is, despite its ancient roots, essentially a modem phenomenon.
Indeed, it may be said to have come into its own as a discipline with
its maturation from the skeletal nineteenth-century pronouncements
of the "law of nations" to the elaborate treaty and institutional
structures of the post-World War I era and, finally, the doctrinal
proliferations of the post-World War II era.7 , As such, the legal
writing with which those in the discipline have become familiar
generally takes the form of a distinctly modernistic rendition of, or
explanation for, the ways in which the law attempts to govern the
world of international relations. Not only does this body of doctrine
and scholarship exhibit a departure from the pre-modem formalism
51bid. at 7.
6/bhi at 7.
7Kennedy has himself written elsewhere on the origins, and eventual twentieth-century
maturation and institutionalization, of international law. See D. Kennedy, "Primitive Legal
Scholarship" (1986) 27 Harv. Int'l LJ. 1; D. Kennedy, 'he Move to Institutions" (1987) 8
Cardozo L. Rev. 841.
1988]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
of rationalist or conceptualist method, but it reveals a pragmatically
modem tendency to situate theory and intellectual reflection in
actual practice - thought becoming a mode of action, and (states')
action being constitutive of thought! Moreover, the themes of this
writing are those of modernity generally, in that the doctrines and
discourse of the past are submerged in favour of a purposive
interpretation of precedents and future direction.
In pursuing their modem tasks, international lawyers have
produced voluminous arguments and doctrines addressed to why and
how state actors are legally bound in the absence of any visible
overarching legal authority. With his interest in rhetorical structures,
Kennedy's task, of course, is not to add to this body of international
legal writing, but to stand one step removed from it, providing what
can only be called a post-modem account of the modem legal
phenomenon. Thus, the book does not explain the rules of the
international game. It rather explains the explanations of the rules;
modem doctrinal expressions are placed under such an intense level
of scrutiny that it becomes clear that it is not the meaning of the
law which is the subject matter of the book, but the "meaning" (if
this word can be used here at all)° of the meaning of law.
In a nutshell, International Legal Structures is itself structured
by a division into what international lawyers generally consider to be
three distinct doctrinal structures: sources, process, and substance.
To use Kennedy's distanced phraseology, each of the three chapters
respectively attempts to unwind modern doctrines and arguments
about the sources of law in an international setting, the international
legal processes of participation and adjudication; and issues of
substantive legality and illegality among states. No attempt will be
8William James provided the classical elaboration of pragmatism as an essential ingredient
in modem thought. See W. James, Pragmadsm and The Meaning of Truth (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1975) at 17-18.
9For this characterization of the modem impulse as one of "calling the past into account,
putting it under indictment, and finally condemning it," as a means of embarking on the
future, see F. Nietzsche, "Of the Use of Misuse of History for Life," trans. and excerpted in
P. de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetodc of Contemporary Ctrcism
(Minneapolis, Minn- University of Minnesota Press, 1983) at 149.
10see Nabokov's well-known observation that "reality' is "one of the few words which
mean nothing without quotes.' V. Nabokov, "On a Book Entitled Lolita," supra, note 3 at 314.
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made in this essay to cover in an exhaustive fashion every nook and
cranny of doctrinal argument with which the reader is meticulously
presented;11 rather, this essay will attempt to illuminate the reader
as to the value of Kennedy's endeavour by mirroring not only the
structure and most fundamental themes of the book, but the analytic
approach itself. That is, Kennedy's basic aesthetic posture,12 his
post-modem analysis of modern international legal expression, will
be explained by reference to, and by a post-modem analysis of,
modem literary expression.
Since Kennedy's approach bears marked similarity to a
literary parsing of various doctrinal arguments, this review's otherwise
unusual approach to a law book seems peculiarly appropriate. In
keeping with the overall structure of the book, three examples of
literary modernism have been chosen, each of which deals in some
way with the respective subject matters or categories of sources,
process, and substance. One early modem piece, Joseph Conrad's
Heart of Darkness,3 will be utilized as an allegory for the modernist
search for the "sources" of meaning and for the doctrinal search for
the sources of international law. Following this, Virginia Woolf's
modern masterpiece, To The Lighthouse,'4 will be used as a medium
through which to highlight the "process" themes of participation and
self-realization in the modem world, and to understand more fully
the doctrines of juridical personality, recognition, international
jurisdiction, and standing. Finally, T"S. Eliot's The Waste Land'5 will
11 In this, the present essay reflects Kennedy's observation about his own book in relation
to traditional treatises: "Although this book is structured somewhat like a treatise on public
international law, the cases and doctrines I have chosen are no more than exemplary. I have
made no effort to be complete or definitive in my compilation of cases and references."
Kennedy, supra, note 2 at 7.
12 0n Kennedy's self-conscious move away from a strictly logical analysis in favour of a
more aesthetically-oriented approach, see D. Kennedy, "'heses About International Legal
Discourse" (1980) 23 Germ. Y.B. Int'l L 353 n.4.
13 j Conrad, Heart of Darkness in The Works of Joseph Conrad (London: J.M. Dent &
Sons Ltd., 1923).
14V. Woolf, To The Lighthouse (New York: The Modem Library, 1937).
1 ST.S. Eliot, The Waste Land in The Complete Poems and Plays of T.. Elot (London:
Faber & Faber, 1969).
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be examined for its high-modernist statement of the "substantive"
state we are in, and for its attendant reflection of modem doctrinal
articulations of substantive rights and wrongs. In reviewing a book
like International Legal Structures, it seems impossible to resist
holding the hail of mirrors in which legal doctrine is scrutinized up
to yet one more set of mirrors.
IT. THE -EART OF DOCTRINE
The primary conceptual problem confronted by the system of
legality obtaining between nations has been apparent at least since
international law was identified by John Austin as being "law
improperly so called."16  That is, international jousting and its
accompanying set of rules takes place in an arena where all the
players are sovereign, but none is the king. This scepticism born of
Austinian positivism, in turn, tends to correspond with the lawyer's
innate distrust of a system which purports to at once emphasize and
abuse the crucial legal concept of sovereignty. The struggle of
international law, and in particular doctrinal pronouncements with
respect to the sources of international law, has been to accommodate
the uncomfortably twinned propositions that the participants as well
as their systematized game are insuperably sovereign.
In an imagistic style which suggests a similar thematic
challenge, Conrad's portrait of Marlow's search for the notorious Mr.
Kurtz is marked by the imaginative pairing of opposites. Heart of
Darkness commences in a mist-shrouded Britain, where the
whereabouts and activities of Kurtz are an enticing mystery, and
where the narrator, Marlow, anticipates the inevitable clarification
and understanding to come from his journey to the clear, untouched
air of Africa. At the same time, the light of European civilization
and the whiteness of European skin, like the lights of London and
the English coast as seen from the ship, fade in Marlow's mind into
the darkness of the unsettled African terrain and the uncivilized
African population. The familiar Thames and the distant, uncharted
Congo River flow in and out of Marlow's consciousness, establishing
16J. Austin, The Province of.TurispudnceDetermined (London: Weidenfeld & Ntcolson,
1954) at 201.
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an early structural opposition which the reader assumes the tale will
ultimately bridge.
As the journey of discovery progresses, however, these
already antonymical images are then turned on their heads. Thus,
the blackness and savagery initially associated with the African jungle
and its people is eventually reversed with the progressive revelation
of the unsavoury European lust after the white tusks of ivory.
Marlow's vision of the enlightenment, health and rational self-control
of English civilization exported to a dark, disease-ridden and
barbarically passionate continent is transformed before the reader's
eyes into a picture of foreign chaos, insanity and sickness invading
the orderly and healthy lives of the Africans in their own world.
The articulate Kurtz engages in "unspeakable rites," the legendary
descriptions which accompanied his life being subtly transmuted into
the cabin boy's simplistic final announcement that "Mistah Kurtz -
he dead. 17 Perhaps most important, the adventurous search into the
heart of a remote continent unearths a message of darkness
discernible in the heart of every person at home. As the imagery
continually flips, and white merges with black just as darkness
becomes light, one gets the feeling that for Marlow (and for
Conrad) nothing is as its seems; true meaning is found in the
opposite of where it would first appear to lie.
Having made one's way through Conrad's clever narrative
imagism, employed in the ingenious attempt to reveal meaning
beneath what otherwise appear to be vacuous adventures of modern
life, one reads the doctrinal statements about the sources of
international law with a remarkable sense of dja vu. It is, of
course, the fundamentally problematic nature of international legality
- the idea of a binding law among sovereigns - that makes for both
the pitfalls and the genius of sources doctrine. For lawyers, the
venture into the relations between states is truly a journey to a
different part of the world; but is one which threatens to be
ultimately unsatisfying in its inability to fill the normative void with
interstate authority. The point of doctrines about sources is to
overcome this appearance of an inevitably vacant system by locating
binding legal authority where the reader was least expecting it, and
17Conrad, supra, note 13 at 150.
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where as a consequence the notion of systemic norms is least
vulnerable to sceptical attack.
In good Conradian fashion, sources doctrine begins with a
pairing of opposite images. As Kennedy notes, the thematic
opposition central to international legal pronouncements about
sources is that of "hard" and "soft" forms of argument! 8  Thus,
"hard" argument, immediately associated with treaty law, presents
itself as grounding the source of binding obligation in the consent of
the relevant sovereigns. Contrarily, "soft" forms of sources argument,
associated in the first instance with customary norms, seek to give
effective embodiment to some transcendent or extra-consensual
notion of justice among states. In this way, the adventure into the
heart of international doctrine truly takes on the quality of a
journey, with the search for sources moving from the familiar starting
point in sovereign authority towards the mysterious, yet promising
notion of systemic (trans-sovereign) control; while at the same time
the hope is held out that the soft vagueness of international
authority over state actions can be crystallized into formal
conformance with the hard specificity of sovereign commands.
Like a nineteenth-century African explorer's, the lawyer's
quest after a transcendent normative authority is at once premised
on a perception of the absence of this type of meaning in the
positivist world of domestic legality, and inspired by the potential for
imbuing the mysteries of transnational law with the sense of clarity
and obligation characteristic of the legal system at home. Yet, true
to the complexities of a modernist understanding of meaning, sources
doctrine allows for no such ready solution. Rather, as one delves
into the detailed rhetorical wrinkles that inform treaty and custom
doctrine, the positions of "hard" and "soft" begin to reverse. Thus,
as Kennedy notes, positivists defending the authoritativeness of
treaties have, in international legal debate, "raised the soft norm
pacta sunt servanda to a new status," 9 even going so far as to
18Supra, note 2 at 29. "Sources rhetoric provides two rhetorical or persuasive styles,
which we might call 'hard' and 'soft'."
1 91bLd. at 34. The notion that agreements or obligations must be obeyed - pacta sunt
servanda - is generally identified as underlying all treaty obligations as "an antecedent general
principle of law": A. Fitzmaurice, "Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of
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"[extend] the validity of treaty-based norms to those who had not
explicitly consented on the grounds that treaty-following was just."20
Likewise, naturalists defending the inherent justice of legal principles
have typically argued that customary law "most accurately
represent[s] the way in which sovereigns want to be treated,"21 so
that custom becomes law 'when 'accepted' as law."22  The desired
message, of course, is not that the law is meaningless, or that it has
no authoritative source, but that things are not as simple as they
seem; one has to look deep, and often in the opposite direction
than that which was anticipated, in order to find a meaningful
source.
When one scrutinizes both Conrad's and the international
lawyer's sophisticated modernism under a post-modem lens, however,
it becomes clear that the pairing of opposites as an explanatory
device simply does not operate so as to expose a true source or
meaning. That is, the erecting of a conceptual dichotomy, and the
subsequent reversals of imagery and styles of argument, make for
intriguing rhetorical and narrative structures, but in the end these
structures are supported only by their own momentum. As
explicative devices, they are self-referring even in their antonyms,
and self-destructive of any possible grounding in a coherent
understanding of their subject matter. The discursive structures of
modernist argument are apparently built on a foundation - a source,
as it were - of thin air.
For Conrad, the problem is quite simple to describe. In
achieving his understanding of the complexities of the human heart
and the darkness of modem life, Marlow's thinking has relied on too
International Law" Symbolae Verijl, Wvar Eysinga et al., eds, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1958) at 153.
2 0Kennedy, ibida at 34.
21 bid. at 35-36.
221bi at 36. Typically, customary norms are said to go beyond sovereign consent in the
source of their authority, while at the same time it is found that they "find [their] source in
the wilt of States": R. Baxter, 'Treaties and Custom" (1970) 129 Recueil des Cours 25, 31;
see also A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1971) at 75 (the "voluntaristic aspect" of customary international law "is
precisely what makes it acceptable to nation-state decision makers').
1988]
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many opposites. Rather than providing clarity and definition, the
images and notions of light and darkness, order and chaos, sickness
and health, savagery and civilization may be seen to have
dangerously supplemented each otherP3 Thus, in imagining his
journey from civilization to savagery down the Congo as providing
a modem parallel for the ancient Roman soldier sailing up the
Thames into barbaric Britain, Marlow effectively undermines the
coherence of either notion by making the meaning of each rely on
its exact opposite. While it is impossible to understand civilization
without reference to inherent human savagery - the very notion of
civilization being that it engulfs and transcends savagery - the
juxtaposition is conceptually dangerous. Civilization needs savagery
for meaning, yet it is threatened by the notion of savagery; for, by
definition, civilization excludes savagery. Civilization seems unable
to live with savagery, and yet is incomprehensible without it. In the
end, all that one can say for Conrad and his Marlow is not that
meaning exists in unexpected places, but that the attempt at
extracting meaning has resulted merely in a clever series of imagistic
manipulations. The reader is presented with a world in which no
point exists without its irreducible, but self-destructive counterpoint.
For the lawyers and statesmen of the international system,
the problem of sources is even further compounded by the
expectations that we bring to the inquiry. That is, like Conrad's
modernist narrative, sources doctrine suffers from the dangerously
destructive attempt to ground the meaning of "hard" in the notion
of "soft", the meaning of principle in consent, state sovereignty in
systemic superiority, et cetera. Beyond this, statements of
international law about sources embody, in Kennedy's words, an
"abstract detachment from the content of the norms whose authority
they delimit....' 24  The idea, as Kennedy explains it, is to utilize
23The notion that the poles of a conceptual dichotomy may constitute a 'dangerous
supplement' for each other has become a mainstay of post-modern interpretation and criticism.
See J. Derrida, Of Grammatolog, trans. G.C. Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1976) at 141-65; and for the application of this notion to legal reasoning, see G. Frugg,
'The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 at 1286-89;
and see also P. Macklem, 'Deconstructing Bliss" (1986) [unpublished manuscript on file with
the author].
24Kennedy, supra, note 2 at 29.
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abstract discussion about a normative order in such a way as to
ensure that both "hard" and "soft' arguments about binding authority
will remain attractive: sovereign autonomy guarantees the
attractiveness of hard, consensual sources, while the separation of
sovereigns (that is, the impermissibility of their mutual impingement)
fortifies the notion that they must restrain their voluntary actions,
such that hard sources ultimately become transcendent and soft.2
Thus, sources doctrine flourishes and, indeed, on its own resolves
numerous international disputes, without ever having to discuss the
very thing that attracted the lawyer's attention in the first place: the
normative content of the interstate system.
Ultimately, therefore, sources discourse must be said to
disguise rather than to expose the inner heart of doctrine. As
Kennedy unearths for his readers repetitive reflections and
permutations of the dichotomized "hard"f'soft" rhetoric,26 it becomes
clear that sources doctrine is riddled with a form of argument which,
to put it mildly, "continues the problematic which motivates it."27
The result of Kennedy's intense scrutiny of these arguments is to
demonstrate that their genius lies in having provided manifold
doctrinal reflections of the underlying juxtaposition of a sovereign
authority with systemic normativity, and in having done so in a way
that allows the contradictory strands of thought to apparently coexist.
The problem is no more resolved than is Marlow's quest for a
solitary, untwined meaning; yet the rhetoric in which the search for
legal sources is conducted makes it appear that the puzzle of
251bi at 32.
2 6Not only do the twinning and surprising reversals of "hard" and "soft," consensual and
systemic, serve to characterize the general nature of treaty and customary law, but even within
each of these categories a similar rhetorical pattern is identified. Thus, for example, doctrines
about treaty creation which emphasize consent (For example, signature, ratification, etc) are
tempered by exceptions to usual treaty norms based in an extrinsic sense of justice ( For
example, rebus sic stantibus - the doctrine of changed circumstances); similarly, doctrines about
custom formation which emphasize a conception of the good (For example, the binding of
non-participating or inactive states) are constantly tempered by doctrines providing for
consensual opting out of customary obligation (For example, "persistent objector'. The
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sovereignty - that is, sovereignty of states versus sovereignty of the
law - has been solved. It seems that if black can coexist with white
in the colour scheme of Marlow's thoughts, or "if the 'hard' can lie
down with the 'soft' in sources arguments," then people will be
civilized in their extant savagery and "sovereigns will be able to
remain autonomous within a binding normative order."
'2
111. TO THE COURTHOUSE
The project of doctrines about international legal process is
system-building. As traditionally presented, the legal
pronouncements in this general category commence with rather
minimalist assertions about the attributes of statehood, recognition
and juridical stature in the international arena. They then move
through various attempts to delineate the outer limits of domestic
jurisdiction and to define the requirements of participation in an
inter-sovereign system, and finally culminate with full-blown
expressions of international process in the procedural mechanisms of
international institutions and the World Court. The fundamental
idea is to elaborate a systemic or participatory structure for
independent states, which can support what is here still only hinted
at: the enforcement of substantive international norms.
Virginia Woolf's modernist classic, To The Lighthouse,
expresses a parallel theme of participatory interaction in the
movement toward, as opposed to the substantive definition of, truth.
The deceptively simple plot depicts the family of characters
simultaneously striving toward and deferring to a different day their
ultimate goal, the connotation being that it is the process of
considering and getting to a meaningful existence, rather than the
shape of meaning itself, that is the subject with which the author is
concerned. Woolf is nothing if not a master of narrative and
structural technique, and the intricate interpersonal drama portrayed
in the novel, all sculpted from the bare factual material of a
conversation about the weather and a planned trip to a nearby
lighthouse, evidences this craftsmanship. Each character to appear
28Kennedy, ibid at 32.
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on the scene, from the naively excitable son, James, to the artistic
and independent Lily Briscoe, the calculating and realist Mr. Ramsay,
and the imaginative and impractical Mrs. Ramsay, embodies a distinct
perspective on or version of truth, and each is portrayed with equal
vigour and intimacy by a narrator that seems capable of observation
from both within each individual consciousness and from its own
omniscient point of view.
Not only does the narrative account weave in and out of
each character's mind as the rudimentary plot unfolds, but the
overall structure of the book is such as to reflect the competing
personalities and versions of truth. In particular, the first chapter,
"The Window", is paired with the second, "Time Passes", in a way
that accentuates the conflict between the warm and passive female
and the cold and active male figures of Mrs. and Mr. Ramsay. The
reader is, quite literally, presented with a window on the sea, an
initial insight into the paradoxical mental fluidity and physical inertia
of the woman for whom the social logic of bearing children has
replaced the urge for artistic creation. This, in turn, is followed by
an account of the similarly paradoxical corrosive yet blind passage of
time, or the predictable stability and methodological activity of the
man for whom a career of logical inquiry has undermined the
capacity for intuitive or imaginative vision. The fixed gender
identities, much like politically self-interested states, are presented as
both autonomous and mutually destructive in their unresolved,
competitive situation.
The goal of To The Lighthouse is not so much to surmount
or diminish the insurmountably opposite gender types, but to point
to an androgynous forum in which the man can partake of the
woman's vision, and the woman can participate in the man's energy.
In the third and final chapter, "To The Lighthouse," Mrs. Ramsay
has died and the artist, Lily Briscoe, paints for Mr. Ramsay an
idealized version of his late wife, her creation from memory
somehow defusing the destructive opposition of femininity and
masculinity by negating the opposition, but not the characteristics, of
either. One is reminded that throughout the first part of the book,
as the narrative voice vacillated from one character's mind to
another, the omniscient storyteller periodically repeated the line,
"Someone had blundered," signalling that although many diverse
perspectives exist, it is crucial that something replace the extant
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
opposition of forces. In the last part of the book, the same
narrative voice describing the eventual boat ride to the lighthouse
repeats at intervals the phrase, "We perished, each alone," the
connotation again being that unbridled antagonism, or autonomy of
self-conception, is inevitably destructive. Like the lighthouse in
Chapter One, the painting in Chapter Three is never actually
described for the reader. Yet as the characters move toward their
goal, and as the artist fashions the idealized woman from imaginative
memory, the various perspectives on the lighthouse are seen to have
at least achieved a medium for expression, replacing their initially
insulated and uncommunicative existence.
Much like the Ramsays, states are initially portrayed in
process doctrine as being autonomous in their self-conceptions and
antagonistic in their identities and world views. Indeed, the very
attributes of their statehood - the characteristics which give them
juridical personality - are for the most part said to rest on the types
of unilateral assertions of stature which stand in destructive
opposition to any equivalent assertion of personality with which they
collide. Thus, for example, an entity must simply acquire a
discernible population and territory, and maintain over these an
effective coercive power, in order to be three-quarters of the way to
being a full-fledged international person. 9 As Kennedy notes,
international law therefore sets itself the task of providing some
systemic or participatory definition for its juridical persons and for
the jurisdictions of these entities vis-t-vis each other, as well as a
definition of the system itself vis-a-vis each of these international
persons3 °
29See Montevideo Convention On Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 28 A.J.I.L. Supp.
(1934) 75: 'The State as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (d) government; and (d)
capacity to enter into relations with other States."
30Supra, note 2 at 117.
"Doctrines of 'participation' abstractly delimit the actors whose interests and nature
will be constitutive of international law and whose substantive behaviour will be
controlled by international law. Doctrines of what might loosely be called
juisdiction' abstractly delimit the avenues of legitimate interchange out of which
authoritative norms grow and the spheres of activity which will be governed by
substantive international law."[Footnotes omitted.]
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The narrative techniques in which process norms are
expressed are typically rather clever. That is, the logic of doctrines
about participation and procedures in the interstate system is such
that it provides a medium for communication and a forum for action
between nations which has many substantive overtones, without
having to explicitly delineate what kind of things states are
prohibited from saying or doing. Thus, by way of illustration, the
doctrine of recognition is said to provide for a systemic affirmation
or veto on the otherwise auto-determined (that is, determined by the
subject entity itself) question of who it is that counts as a sovereign
participant and has an official voice in substantive international
discourse,31 while it remains distinctly silent, or deferential, with
respect to the content of such discourse. Yet, as Kennedy points
out, "[r]ecognition seems to lead a double life."32 While remaining
substantively deferential to sovereign autonomy, it provides the
registry of whose voice (and, consequently, of what viewpoints) will
be heard in international forums.
Much like Lily Briscoe, in bridging the communicative gap
between the opposing personalities, the creative or system-building
efforts of process doctrine point the way toward a substantive,
idealized view of truth. The reader is, in a sense, duped, but it
seems all for a good cause. After all, the initial positions of outright
antagonism were viewed as destructive by all observers of the scene.
In moving toward substance, and providing an androgynous space in
which the qualities of female and male can participate in productive
expression, Lily gives us a strong hint that the ultimate view of truth
will certainly look more like Mrs. than Mr. Ramsay;33 likewise, in
providing the framework for the expression of conflicting viewpoints,
process doctrine moves towards substance, thus hinting at the
ultimate form of the dispute's resolution. In structuring the
3 1For a classic articulation of this notion, see the statement of Cardozo 3. in Sokoloff v.
National Cio, Bank of New York 239 N.Y. 158 at 165 (1924); 145 N.E. 917 at 918 (1924):
"Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may be viewed as no government at all... "
32Supra, note 2 at 132.
3 3Some feminist critics, most notably Kate Millett, have identified the image of Mrs.
Ramsay as representing Virginia Woolf's ideal of femininity. See K. Millett, Sexual Politics
(London: Virago, 1977) at 139-140.
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courthouse, the engineers can't help but provide a glimpse of the
merits of the case.
There is, however, a crucial problem in both bodies of
narrative. The dilemma of To The Lighthouse is presented by the
fact that in overcoming the dangers of the binary gender oppositions,
Lily Briscoe's solution can also self-deconstructL4  That is, Lily
perceives masculinity as an inherent supplement for femininity, and
undermines the meaning of the opposition by identifying it as just
one more construct in our social discourse, our narrative, which can
be unmade just as it was "mad"-made. What goes unsaid, however,
is that Lily herself is equally a product of the narrative. Woolf's
elusive narrator weaves its way in and out of Lily's consciousness just
as it does for every character in the book, implying that the version
of truth that is Lily is just one more artificial construct of a narrative
which, despite its remaining unidentified, has a personality all its
own. Woolf therefore seems ultimately to be caught in the
cleverness of her technique. By spinning a narrative web through
multiple viewpoints and forces, she undermines the truth of each
autonomous one while creating a structure in which oppositions can
be transcended in a movement toward a synthesized truth; but in the
process she reveals her own movement or structure to be just one
more artificial construct to be spun into yet some other web.
Just as Woolf cannot possibly identify truths as fundamentally
contingent and surmountable in one breath and identify her own
transcendent truth in the next, so international process doctrine can
ultimately be seen to be too clever by half. In Kennedy's words, the
gimmick of process doctrine is to maintain its posture as the "humble
handmaiden to a substantive international legal regime," while
simultaneously "assert[ing] itself as the dispositive international legal
regime."35 It accomplishes this magic by articulating both a deference
to sovereign authority and an assertion of its own systemic authority,
the double implication being that the system is no more, but also
34For an identification of Virginia Woolf's method as early deconstructionist, and of Lily's
role in To The Lighthouse being to "deconstruct the death-dealing binary oppositions of
masculinity and femininity," see T. Mol, SezualfTexual Politics: Feminist Literay Theory
(London: Methuen, 1985) at 13.
35Kennedy, mipra, note 2 at 166-167.
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much greater, than the sum of its partst 6 The famous Nottebohm
case,3 7 in which Guatemala's confiscation of an individual's property
was analyzed by the International Court of Justice as a question of
Liechtenstein's standing to bring a claim on the individual's behalf,
is cited by Kennedy in illustration of just such an international
process trick.38 In dismissing the claim against Guatemala on the
basis of Liechtenstein's lack of legitimate association with the
individual complainant, the court raised its own authority over that
of the claiming state when considering Liechtenstein's participatory
position; and at the same time it is submitted to the insular state
authority of Guatemala in considering the substance of the action.
The result of this convoluted process discourse is to establish
for the institutional embodiments of the international system the
authority to act in facilitation, but not restriction, of state power.
Despite the system's elaborate exercise in self-assertion, therefore,
the approaches and techniques employed in international process
doctrine serve to construct a system which is forced to constantly
jockey for strategic position much like any one of its constituent
state parts. The system's strength, it would seem, is based on its
own tactical manoeuvres in avoiding direct confrontation with any
equally strong sovereign. In Lily Briscoe fashion, the forum
constructed for mediating the various opposing forces gets caught up
3 6The following statement by the Permanent Court of International Justice is perhaps apt:
... the independence of Austria ... is nothing else but the existence of Austria ... as
a separate State and not subject to the authority of any other State or group of
States. Independence as thus understood is really no more than the normal
condition of States according to international law, it may also be described as
sovereignty ... by which is meant that the State has over it no other authority than
that of international law.
Austro-Gennan Customs Union Case (Advisory Opinion), [1931] P.C.I.J. Rep. Ser. A/B, No.
41. The suggestion seems to be that independent Austria is under the authority of no other
state, but is under the authority of all other states.
3 7(Liechtenstein v. Guatemata), [19551 LC.J. Rep. 4.
3 8Supra, note 2 at 166-172.
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in the narrative of which it is a part, becoming in the process just
one more opposing force s 9
IV THE WRONGS-AND-RIGHTS LAND
If the problem of sources doctrine is, as suggested earlier, to
overcome Austin's sceptical attack,40 the challenge of substance is to
deal with international legality's "tender vulnerability to the worlds
of politics and ideology. 41 Having disposed of the assorted problems
of positivism in the more preliminary sources and process stages of
its system-building efforts, international law confronts in its
substantive aspirations the seemingly dangerous obstacle of realism.
42
The idea is to control political confrontation through substantive
norms of war and peace, or doctrines which manage state force and
mandate interstate cooperation, without succumbing to the pressures
of realpolitik seen to be lurking beneath both the formulation and
the enforcement of the rules. In short, international law must, in its
final phase of defining substantive rights and wrongs, transcend the
political contexts of which it is born.
In approaching this task, modern substance doctrine evokes
from its audience a sense of promise as well as disappointment. The
regime of substantive international law is fragmented and scattered
across the subject matters and geography of the world. As Kennedy
39Perhaps the most explicit illustration of this phenomenon in international process, or
system-building doctrine, is found in the Reparations Case (Advisory Opinion), [1949] I.CJ.
Rep. 174, where it was held that the United Nations, as an institutional embodiment of the
international legal system, is itself a possessor of juridical personality and can therefore claim
compensation when injured by a member-state. The court in effect asserted that the system,
like any person, is alive: 'Mhe [U.N.] Charter has not been content to make the Organisation
that created it merely a centre 'for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends' (Article 1, para. 4). It has equipped that centre with organs..." [emphasis
added].
40Supra, note 16 and accompanying text.
41Kennedy, supra, note 2 at 196.
42See, for example, H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf,
1967) at 282: "Both attempt and success [at establishing substantive international law norms]
depend upon political considerations and the actual distribution of power in a particular case."
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notes, "while some areas (that is, some substantive fields or
geographic regions) ... are rather elaborately regulated, others await
normative treatment," the overall effect being one of a complex, and
at times highly detailed, patchwork43 The fractured quality of this
regime, reflecting the apparent political and ideological sensitivities
of the issues and the attendant difficulties in normative expression,
in turn engenders some degree of hope for the future and
frustration with the present and past. In Kennedy's words, "the
fragmentation of substantive doctrine seems both to undercut and to
substantiate its utopian relationship to expectations generated by
process and sources......44  The aspirational paradox of substantive
international law, therefore, is that of modernist expression generally:
the desire to break free from historical-political contexts and start
afresh, and at the same time to inaugurate a new political history
based on the substantive norms being pronounced.45
Probably the most famous modernist text in English
literature, and certainly the .one which in the most head-on way
addresses the question of history and the apparent contextualization
of meaning, is TS. Eliot's poem The Waste Land. The renowned,
if depressing, modern response to the question of whether
understanding can be achieved within history - that is, absent an
abstraction from historical contexts - is contained in the opening
image of the work. Eliot proclaims that:
April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire.46
43Supra, note 2 at 193.
441bid at 196.
4 5For the now classic identification of this paradom-cal modernist impulse to both break
free from and re-start history, see P. de Man, "Literary History and Literary Modernity" in
P. de Man, supra, note 9 at 142-165. For a critical appraisal of this paradox as expressed in
modem literature, see W. Steiner, "Collage or Miracle: Historicism in a Deconstructed
World" in S. Bercovitch, ed., Reconstructing American Literary History (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1986) at 323-351.
4 6Supra, note 15 at 61, lines 1-3.
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Historicism, and the processes of history itself, certainly do not seem
to hold the promise of meaning, the connotation of the poem's
introductory phrase being that the memory of an understanding in
context and the futile desire to achieve a trans-historical
understanding from our present vantage point, are both cruel and
painful endeavours. The spiritual death that is at the core of the
wasteland stems, quite obviously, from the perceived impossibility of
achieving knowledge unconditioned by a particular contextual or
historical framework, and yet the continued acknowledgment that a
specifically conditioned understanding cannot contain objective truth.
Eliot bitterly asks,
That corpse you planted last year in your garden,
Has it begun to sprout?47
thus signalling the failure of past meanings for present
comprehension and the futility of present endeavours for future
meanings.
It is Eliot's radical doubt of meaning in historical context, his
realization of the subjectivity of such knowledge, which marks his
work as the high-point for modernist thought and expression.4 8
History, somewhat like the fragmented yet oddly complete poem
itself, becomes
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats
And the dead tree gives no shelter.4 9
If knowledge and meaningful expression are to be achieved, history
is something to be avoided; yet the view from the present is
acknowledged as just one more subjective construct, which eventually
will be shown to have been as mortal as the contexts of the past.
47IbTL at 63, lines 71-72.
4 8For an elaboration of this theme of doubt and negation of the traditional constructs
of knowledge, see E.K. Hay, T.S. Eliot's Negative Way (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1982) esp. at 48-49.
49Eliot, supra, note 15 at 61, line 22.
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Accordingly, although contemporary understanding is seductive,
inviting comfort in the present state of our knowledge ("(Come in
under the shadow of this red rock),"50 beckons Eliot in parentheses),
its revelations are of a frightening variety. "I will show you fear in
a handful of dust,"51 we are told, as a reminder of the particularity
and mortality of even our present grasp of truth.
It is this fundamental indeterminacy of knowledge, and the
failed understandings of even the high-points of human history and
culture, that leads to the fragmented allusions and imagery of the
poem. In the final section of The Waste Land, the reader is taken





All of the most notable attempts at cultural achievement
within history are grandiosely reduced to "[c]racks and reforms and
bursts in the violet air."53 The message which Eliot's modern critics
have elucidated from the apparent destruction of his own myriad
historical allusions, and the sheer number and jarring juxtaposition
of obscure and unrelated references, is that the actual historical
significance of the allusions is, in fact, minimal 5 4 The assumption
is that either the allusions are purely formal structures, in which case
one can comprehend their significance even if their source is a
mystery, or they are essentially fictitious, in which case Eliot could
have as easily been drawing from his imagination as from history
50Ibid. at line 26.
511bht at line 30.
521bid at 73, lines 373-376.
53 bibl at line 372.
5 4For a well-known -ample of Eliot criticism, see W.K. Wimsatt & M. Beardsley, 'The
Intentional Fallacy" in H. Adams, ed., Critical Theory Since Plato (New York. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1971) esp. at 1019-1020.
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books 5 In either case, the implication is that the poem has
championed a distinctly ahistorical brand of knowledge. Eliot is seen
to be something of a literary structuralist,56 imagining true
understanding to be isolated from history much as one can
comprehend the fragmented poem without actual familiarity with all
of the fragments; the creative energy and allusions of the poem
seem themselves to prove that the "heap of broken images" of the
past will not effect the productions of the present.
A thematically similar attempt to divorce the formulation of
substantive international law from the historical-political contexts of
which international relations are composed, is found in what is
perhaps the high-point of modem substance doctrine: the law of the
sea. As Kennedy notes, this is one of the most ancient and the
most modem branches of all of international law, the seventeenth-
century debate between Grotius and Selden having now given way
to the impressively detailed and comprehensive regime of the 1982
Convention57 Indeed, the struggle of legal modernism to lift its
substantive pronouncements out of their material contexts can be
appreciated precisely when compared to the approach taken by
international lawyers of an earlier era. For this reason, Kennedy
finds it fruitful to compare the debated versions of right and wrong
posed by Selden and Grotius - the former having argued strenuously
for the oceans to be divided into sovereign dominions like the land,
and the latter having advocated a rule of freedom of the seas - with
the approach of the state-of-the-art modern maritime regime.
Pre-modem discourse on the law of the sea is presented as
having offered a choice of authoritative freedom or dominion5 8
55For a similar summary of this type of standard interpretive approach to Eliot, see
Steiner, supra, note 45 at 333-334.
56For an example of structuralist thought, see C. Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology,
trans. C. Jacobsen & B. Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963). Kinship systems, historical
events, and political trends can all be understood in either historical or ahistorical terms.
5 7Supra, note 2 at 201-205. For the text of the 1982 Convention On the Law of the Sea,
see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 61/122; 21 Int. Leg. Mat. 1261 (1982). For an account of the
Grotius-Selden debate and its place in ancient legal thought, see D. Kennedy, "Primitive Legal
Scholarship," (1986) 27 Harm. Int'l LJ. 1.
5 8Kennedy, ibid. at 203.
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Although in one sense these positions seem to remind us of
contemporary substantive argument which gravitates around the
autonomy and cooperation of sovereigns,59 one has to agree with
Kennedy that "their bold assertions seem na'fve."60 And this naivety
seems to trace directly to the very unflinching quality with which the
historically particular visions of the Dutchman and the Englishman,
each of whose discursive positions so conveniently and with
unspoken perfection reflected the strategic positioning of his parent
nation, were posited as trans-contextual rules for all time.
Seventeenth-century sovereigns yielded a doctrine now notable for
its naive self-confidence.
By contrast, the sophisticated modernism of the 1982
Convention On the Law of the Sea reveals no such immature
assertiveness. In the first place, as Kennedy points out, the text of
the Convention exhibits a certain loss of confidence by the sovereign
signatories and by their collective system.61 Rather than primitively
unhesitant articulations of legal rights and punishable wrongs, the
Convention presents a continuous deferral of its substantive rules to
some later point and referral back to some earlier normative
formulation. In Kennedy's words, reading the Convention is certainly
a "puzzling experience, 62 modern states having "created the
international legal order by balancing procedural regimes."63 In the
result, one is cognizant of the document's stature as the high-water
mark of substantive international legality, yet one is at a loss to
identify "the mechanism by which it establishes itself as a substantive
legal regime.'"' 14
59Kennedy identifies this polarity as forming the thematic structure for much of
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The Convention moves from a statement of substantive
purposes in the Preamble, to a series of architectural or jurisdictional
issues, institutional rules, and dispute resolution procedures. That
is to say, this comprehensive sea regime provides an illustrative
microcosm of the fragmented world of substance doctrine generally,
in that the aspirations of substance are coupled with a displacement
back into the process and forward into state practice. This
elaboration of a complex procedural and institutional environment,
all of which stands in support of a substantive set of norms which is
referred to but which never actually appdars, embodies both the
disappointment and the genius of modem substance doctrine. The
intricacy of its structure and the complexity of its mechanisms for
delaying and diverting the moment of substance has replaced the
historically-bound rights and wrongs of Grotius' time with a
seemingly detached, unbound understanding pertinent to all future
time. Ironically, therefore, it is this apparently unsubstantive
approach which allows substantive international law the appearance
of having accomplished its twin modem goals: the detachment of
itself from historical-political context and the initiation of a new
history with a cooperative normative thrust.
Both the Convention and The Waste Land (according to the
poem's modem interpreters) accomplish their tasks of unbound
understanding by strenuously attempting to bracket their
understandings from historical context altogether. In this respect
both texts seem equally inspiring and equally absurd. One cannot
help but admire the goal pursued and energy expended, yet for all
of their complexity each product seems almost purposely to be
unsatisfactory. The Convention strives to insulate substantive legality
from international politics by removing any ascertainable substance
from its numerous terms. Eliot, in similar fashion, seems to many
modern readers to have revealed the subjective quality of historical
understandings by means of an imagery which heavily utilizes and
then destroys historical allusions, the suggestion being that the poem
should be read and comprehend without knowledge of the history to
which it alludes. What remains is a high-point of substance doctrine
230 [Vcoi 26 NO. I
Book Review
void of substance, and a high modernist poem that is, in terms of
modernist understanding, almost completely incomprehensible.
65
The notion that modem international law is complete when
lacking in substance seems almost as bizarre as the idea that Eliot's
incessantly historical poem can be appreciated without any awareness
of history. An alternative form of understanding, however, is
suggested by Eliot's own writing. In a well-known essay on the
position of the individual artist in history, Eliot described present
culture as "a living whole of the poetry that has ever been written,"66
the idea being that the history of culture is, in effect, the history of
informed interpretations and creative re-expressions of all that has
come before. Taking this cue, one can read in "The Waste Land"
and its many historical allusions a distinctly post-modern, rather than
modem, message; that is, the poem may be seen to contain an
interpretative strategy for unravelling its own mysteries. In
condensing western cultural history into a 431-line poem, Eliot
causes the reader inevitably to inquire about its meaning, and in so
inquiring the reader educates him- or herself and re-creates the
history the reader has come to know.67 The message of the text
seems to be to encourage the reader to overcome the failures of
history by actively pursuing the knowledge required to understand
the text. Only through a highly sensitized, historically aware reading
can the reader transcend the chaotic maze and "heap of broken
images" that are the poem and our cultural history.
The interpretive approach which transcends the detailed
chaos of modem substance doctrine is suggested not so much by the
Convention On the Law of the Sea or some other, doctrinal text, but
by the post-modernism of Kennedy's analytic approach. In
intensifying our scrutiny of the rhetorical modes in which doctrine
65As one critic has noted, "It is perhaps unnecessary to point out how little of 'The
Waste Land' is not allusive, that is, 'present and knowable in itself'." Steiner, supra, note 45
at 334.
66T.S. Eliot, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent," in T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, 1917-
1932 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932) at 7.
670ne post-modem reader of Eliot has noted that "the modem wasteland is redeemed
only when people again read literature, value the tradition, and themselves create the syntheses
that actively remake the past into a historical present.' Steiner, supra, note 45 at 338.
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presents itself, he not only reveals the self-effacing outcome of the
attempt to de-contextualize substance doctrine, but sends the reader
of modem international law texts on a search to reconstruct the
meaning of doctrinal language. Thus, for example, in inquiring into
modem sea law's odd deflection of attention back to process and
forward to interpretation or practice, one also comes to perceive the
historical positioning of legal substance between a moment of
agreement (the Preamble) and a process of implementation (the
Convention).f8 By so situating the text historically between an
instant of closure and a wide open process, the reader becomes
aware of the momentum generated by international legal discourse;
and it is from the dust of this movement that the sovereign states
emerge as "parties" to the system and its rules.
69
In the process of deconstructing the logic with which
international doctrine presents itself, Kennedy's readers therefore
become aware of a thematic undercurrent which has been present
in international law all along. Modern doctrinal pronouncements
seem inevitably to be "relying upon an image of the determination
of discourses past and the indeterminacy of discourses future,"70 thus
positioning themselves as the energy or momentum coming between
stasis and motion. In this way, as Kennedy notes, "the rhetorical
system is able both to claim to be becoming an international order
and to be experienced as fulfilling that promise."71 The reward for
the reader who probes this rhetorical mass whose doctrines straddle
determinacy and indeterminacy is the discovery that the energy of
this discursive see-saw is not only self-generating, but is its own
point.
By the time one has finished with International Legal
Structures, international law has come to be seen as a medium
6Kennedy, supra, note 2 at 205-206.
69Ibid at 205: "By situating the text historically, between a moment of intention (by the
'conscious' States Parties) and a moment of implementation (by the text and the order), the
Preamble seems to transform individual states into parties.'
70Ibid at 294.
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"suited to a practice of interminable discourse."72 Accordingly, what
seemed to be the fatal defect - the interminable movement toward,
rather than the expected arrival at sources, process and substance -
is revealed to be "the subtle secret of [international law's] success."
73
The fact that international legal discourse can be kept up seemingly
forever, its rhetorical repetitions and doctrinal transmutations
rebounding through time, geography and subject matters as if in a
hall of slightly warped mirrors, is what keeps the law alive as a
subject of study. The reader comes to appreciate international law
in much the same way as Nabokov would have his readers appreciate
Humbert's chaotic infatuation for Lolita: the endless play with
words providing for the continuous movement forward.
It is therefore the regenerative process of discourse itself,
rather than any of the particular reflections or apparent stops along
the way, which is the object of Kennedy's study and the subject
which his readers come to know best. Likewise, it is this inherent
momentum of international rhetoric that allows the doctrine to both
root itself in and to transcend its historical-political contexts, and
which inspires us as scholars of international law to transcend the
particular doctrinal contexts which the legal texts on their face
present to us. The post-modern scrutiny of legal language, and the
understanding of doctrinal structures as rising and falling constructs
able to propel themselves through a history of political contexts,
allows us to finally appreciate the maze of international legality as
possessing a rhetorical force which transcends its own fractured
doctrines. With this understanding it seems possible to move with
international law into the future, preventing its modem present and
past pronouncements from being what Eliot would have called
"withered stumps of time."74
72bid
731bid
74The Waste Land, supra, note 15 at 64, line 105.
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